No 3(66) (2019)
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INTERVIEW
7-16 1584
Abstract
Thomas Biersteker took part in 2019 Gerda Henkel Forum: Values and Interests in Communication Between Russia and The West held in MGIMO-University in late April this year and on the margins of the Forum he was kind enough to give an interview to our editor Vadim Belenkov on effectiveness of targeted international sanctions. Professor Biersteker is a renowned expert on this issue, he co-edited a book «Targeted Sanctions» recently published by Cambridge University Press. The interview shows that targeted sanctions involve restrictive measures against a narrowly-defined range of individuals and firms. Professor Biersteker explained in detail the difference between sanctions with the purpose of coercion, constraining and signaling. He reaffirmed his claim that effectiveness of sanctions should be studied separately for each type of purposes. In the interview professor Biersteker updated some of the findings published in his book three years ago. In 2016 constraining and signaling sanctions were effective at the same level, 27 % of the time. Today data reveal that effective constraining fell by 4 % points and effective signaling rose by 2 % points. Effectiveness of coercion remains at 10 %. The average effectiveness of sanctions across three types is about 20 %. Taking into consideration the difficulty of conflicts and issues over which sanctions are applied – North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s potential development of nuclear weapon program, ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, the Middle East – 20 % should not be considered a small figure. Biersteker also reaffirmed the «sanctions paradox» found in 1999 by Daniel Drezner that very often the countries against which sanctions would be most likely effective are those that are most interdependent whereas sanctions are usually applied in situations when they are less likely to be effective.
RESEARCH ARTICLES. International Sanctions
17-41 1332
Abstract
Through the recent decades, the use of asymmetric and hybrid measures in international relations has acquired a qualitatively new scale and system. Today such measures have turned into one of the leading forms of external pressure and subsequent coercion, often exceeding the effectiveness of such straightforward instruments as the threat of potential use of force and almost equal to real power actions. Arguably, among those asymmetric and hybrid measures, Western countries assign a key role to the pressure of international sanction upon competitor nations and uncooperative actors on the world arena. The article is devoted to a critical analysis of some common approaches to the study of the problems of «targeted» sanctions in the theory and practice of international relations and the use of sanctions as a means of achieving geostrategic objectives, including such ambitious ones as social constructivism and social engineering on national, regional and global scales. Particular attention is paid to the contribution of Thomas Biersteker to the development of the theory and of practical designs of «targeted sanctions» in international relations. The author disputes with him over some issues related to the effectiveness of targeted sanctions and the impact they produce upon various sectors of the targeted societies. Based on the author’s schematic matrix of sanctional influences upon national elites and possible limits of their responses, the article formulates the principles of segmentation of the national elites both for the purposes of identifying the layers most susceptible to sanctional pressure and singling out most effective and capable strata from the point of view of practical implementation of the indented outcomes of the undertaken pressure from the outside.
42-60 1353
Abstract
Since the late 1940s Western countries have regularly used sanctions, embargoes and other similar instruments to counter the development of the Soviet and, after 1991, the Russian energy industry. The author tries to answer two research questions: what provokes such a policy of the West: political rivalry or economic competition? Has the West changed its attitude to the Russian energy industry after the end of the Cold war? The first part of the study covers the years of the Cold war; the second part is devoted to the period following the collapse of the USSR. The article deals with generic approaches of Western countries to the Soviet and Russian energy industry, as well as their stances on major oil and gas pipelines, including the «Druzhba» (or the «Friendship») oil pipeline, the Soyuz gas pipeline, The «Urengoy – Pomary – Uzhhorod» (or the West-Siberian) gas pipeline, the Nord Stream 1,2 gas pipelines. The author came to the following conclusions. The main inspirer of sanctions and other restrictive measures of the West against the Soviet and Russian energy industry has always been the United States of America. The core motive of such behavior has been political rivalry, although in certain periods (for example, in the 1950s-1960s, 2010-ies) the United States may also be driven by economic competition or the desire to ensure the interests of its energy companies. Western European countries have often been in solidarity with the American actions against the Soviet or Russian energy complex. However, when their strategic interests are affected (for example, in case of construction of the Urengoy – Pomary – Uzhgorod and Nord stream 2 gas pipelines), they can resist the dictates of Washington. This is due both to pressure from Western European business interested in cooperation with the USSR or Russia in the energy field, and a strong desire of Western European countries to diversify oil and gas supplies from the Middle East and to solve some other energy problems, for instance, to mitigate transit risks associated with Ukraine. Overall, the end of the Cold war has not radically changed the policy of the West towards the Russian energy industry.
RESEARCH ARTICLES. Glocalization
61-88 2249
Abstract
The author’s focal point is the interconnection and interdependence of geopolitics and business and corporate interests of modern states, primarily great powers in the new post globalized political and economic world order. Growing crisis of globalization has set up new rules of the game of market forces as a result of emerging new centers of state power, both in Europe and in Asia at the expense of «indispensable» America. American decay has become the buzz – word in academic community on both sides of the Atlantic. On «The Self Destruction of American Power» and on how «Washington squandered the Unipolar Moment» for example elaborates Fareed Zakaria, well known columnist and the author of «Post – American World». The question raised and answered in the article is how successfully international business adapts to new conditions of post globalization world and more fragmented marketplace. According to the author corporate interests in a way have become hostage to perilous geopolitical designs and protectionist strategies. The present Trump administration concerned by the rise of China and other competitors wages trade wars against both friends and foes more often than not at the expense of American businesses. The old Marxist dogma and economic determinism that «economics dictates politics» is not valid anymore under the new conditions of strengthening geopolitical rivalry of major world powers and their fighting for supremacy in international politics without due regard for specific business gains or losses. The United States being the only superpower is doing its utmost to stay the course of global hegemony and raises stakes for higher geopolitical risks at the expense of transnational business interests. Its relationships with China and Russia referred to by Washington as «revisionist powers» are at the forefront of the research. The key question to be answered as a result of the offered narrative is whether international cooperation or confrontation today plays a key role from the perspective of corporate “bottom line”.
89-110 1909
Abstract
The article aims at evaluating the One Belt One Road project implemented by China that will define long-term trajectories of the world trade and finance development as well as prospects of Russia’s participation in this project. It seems that the project under consideration is not a full alternative to the existing nowadays world system of railroad and sea shipping both from the viewpoint of the shipping cost and the scope of investment required. A possibility of full-scale refocusing of Russia’s transport systems (the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea Route) on the One Belt One Road project is not currently obvious, thus, one cannot state with certainty Russia’s role in this project. Besides, implementing this project results in building in Eurasia a China-centric economy system that does not coincide with the structures built by Russia, i.e. the Eurasian Economic Union, the Customs Union and other ones. At the same time, the One Belt One Road project seems to have no alternatives. None of the other countries has proposed a project that can be compared with the One Belt One Road one in terms of being large-scale, having a global impact as well as long-term effects. It is believed, that after the implementation of the project is complete, the technological and social differences between Europe’s and China’s potentials, which were the reason for shipping goods from Southeast Asia to Europe over the past centuries, will be reduced to a significant extent. In terms of this the China-centric world will have to provide different noneconomic reasons for its existence, i.e. provide the world with new values and meanings of the postindustrial world. In this context Russia’s participating in the One Belt One Road project may appear to be necessary: Russia can act as a project’s security operator, a mediator between China and the countries who are participants of the Silk Road Economic Belt in cases where their interests collide. Russia can also generate values and meanings of economic processes. The safe transportation routes Russia has, i.e. the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Northern Sea Route as well as long-term friendly relations with the countries-participants of the Silk Road Economic Belt and Russia’s being experienced in harmonizing different interests can become the key aspects contributing to success of this project.
111-130 860
Abstract
The article analyzes the Russian citizens’ perceptions of BRICS countries. The authors focus on the cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and symbolic aspects characterizing BRICS countries in political consciousness of the Russians as well as common stereotypes, intentions, and associations. Since the Russian Federation has political and economic interests in cooperation with the BRICS countries, it is important to study representations of Brazil, India, China and South Africa in Russian consciousness and identify the possibilities of their transformation. Proceeding from the results of qualitative politico-sociological (a series of focused interviews) and politico-psychological (projective tests) studies held in 2016-2018 the authors conclude that the emotional component prevails in the structure of Russian citizens’ perception about of Brazil, India, China and South Africa. The image of China appears to be the most complicated and multidimensional, with the key elements being the “thousand-year history”, the “great culture” and the recognition of the geopolitical power of this state. The images of India and Brazil among the Russians have a significantly more amorphous character, but at the same time hold a moderately positive emotional connotation. The image of South Africa is the most fragmented, devoid of stable emotional valence and bright associations. It is remarkable that the perception of the BRICS countries by the majority of respondents is primarily influenced by implicit factors which manifest in appeal to stereotypes and associations (India – cinema, Brazil – football, etc.). Dynamic factors, determined by political agenda, play a minor role forming the images of the BRICS countries. A noticeable feature of their representation among the Russians is the blurring of the “image of due” and “image of the future”, as well as the minimal role of the political component (with exception of China). Therefore, it is necessary to change the information policy for the countries studied. In order to enhance the understanding of significance and relevance of cooperation with the BRICS states among the Russian citizens, it seems to be necessary 1) to build a positive image of political relations with them; 2) to cement an image of a “partner” and an “ally” in mass media, both on a rational and an unconscious level of political perception.
131-158 971
Abstract
Budget consolidations in Visegrád countries, which followed European financial and debt crisis, were mainly driven by external factors such as EU fiscal governance. Since the Visegrád countries have accomplished their consolidation effort, it seems topical to study their experience and assess the efficiency of consolidation measures. Involving descriptive statistical analysis, the authors posit that supranational impact on national budgets of Visegrád countries was quite efficient, as all economies concerned have accomplished a relatively sizeable fiscal consolidation. This happened largely due to the fact that the governments did not intend to lose vast amounts of funds from the EU budget. Such an option was quite feasible as a part of possible sanctions related to excessive deficit. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic run different consolidations as to scale, structure and measures taken, though one could highlight some similarities. On the one hand, consolidations were to a great extent carried out through the means of indirect taxation, because they have a less distortive nature, given the structural characteristics of countries at issue. On the other hand, the governments refrained from raising direct taxes due to their distortive character. Hungary was the only country, which took some active measures in the field of corporate taxation, and subsequently suffered from drop in tax collection. The Visegrád countries did cut government expenditures, but strived to use the most effective instruments such as curbing employment in public sector. Further, there were some subsidiary factors at place that influenced consolidation pace. For example, three of four Visegrád countries are not members of a currency union, which inter alia contributed to monetizing government debt. At the same time, some measures taken by the countries, were of a quite formal nature. For instance, Hungary totally nationalized pension system in order to increase budget revenues. Nevertheless, all Visegrád countries reached deficit target without any revolutionary changes to main fiscal aggregates, which means that consolidations were at least nominally effective. However, cumulative deficit change was not fully accompanied by lowering debt and was by several times less than cumulative transfers from the EU budget. At the same time the budget consolidations in Visegrád countries could be called efficient as GDP growth rates restored, as did investors’ confidence and exports.
159-175 1216
Abstract
The current methodological debates on the EU external actions at international organisations raise the issue of the EU coherence. The scholarship tends to focus on EU vertical and horizontal coherence in various policies, making the EU internal coordination central in the analysis. Neither horizontal nor vertical EU coherence leads to understanding why the EU is accused of “double standards”. Little research explores the external contestation as a pivotal matter of the EU effectiveness, performance, actorness. It appears promising to make the EU action coherent over various multilateral bodies. This paper argues that the external environment is the key element for the external coherence of the EU action at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and the Council of Europe (CoE). It answers the research question: how to measure external coherence in EU action at the HRC/CoE? The proposed indicators are the following: 1) coherence in references to the UN/CoE and to the EU founding treaties and pivotal documents on human rights; 2) degree of external support/contestation for the EU objectives at the HRC/CoE; 3) degree of coherence of EU external representation to the HRC/CoE; 4) degree of coherence in formulating priorities and using instruments at the HRC/CoE. The paper provides the assessment by the UN, EU and non-EU experts of the EU external coherence, which is followed by policy recommendations.
RESEARCH ARTICLES. Interchurch Relations
176-201 879
Abstract
The convocation of the Local Council in 1917, the first Council in over two centuries, had a great significance for the internal life of the Orthodox Church of Russia. But in a period when the World War was still ongoing and there were pressing issues to resolve in the sphere of cooperation of Russian Orthodoxy with other orthodox and non-orthodox churches, the Local Council could not but touch upon the international and inter-church issues. For the first time in the history of Russian Church the official ecclesiastical forum was attended by official elected delegates who served abroad and who could bring the opinion of the foreign part of the Russian Church to its «maternal» part and to provide the mutually beneficial exchange of practices and opinions. Moreover, in a situation when the church was liberated from the tutelage of the state, it became possible to engage with foreign religious organizations not through social organizations or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but directly. This opened a way for creating the Church’s own structures which would be responsible for contacts with other confessions, including Old-Catholics and Anglicans, with whom there had already been lengthy unofficial dialogue. The efforts of some historians and publicists shaping contemporary discourse in Russia depict the restoration of the Patriarchate in the Russian Church as the only important act of the Council are challenged by the material presented in this article, which shows how the Council constructed the future position of Russian Orthodoxy in dialogue with the non-Orthodox churches, in its presence abroad and its missions in non-Christian countries. The word of the Council in this sphere was completely new and never before told. The Council was ahead of its time in the issues of international connections (like in many other spheres of its work). Many issues at the Council were expressed for the first time or in a completely new way. How to manage the missions abroad (in Japan, China, Korea, Urmia, and Palestine)? The Council, occupied with the internal problems in the situation of the beginning of persecution against it, could not abandon these missions. How was it possible to unite Russian emigrants abroad? The idea of Paris as a centre of their unification was expressed for the first time at the Council. The scholars who touched upon these issues before analyzed them through the concept of ecumenism (following the participation of the Russian Church in the ecumenical movement). But it seems more appropriate to research them in the context of the time of the Council itself, since it was a time that preceded the emergence of the Ecumenical Movement proper. The author of the article draws a conclusion that during the year of the Council (August 1917 – September 1918) the issues of international and inter-church relationships transformed in its agenda from being of secondary to primary importance. This conclusion allows us to challenge the dismissive perspective that the Moscow Council 1917-1918 was ineffective. Although it did not have time to complete its agenda, the Council was ahead of its time and contributed much for the future mission of the Russian Church in the modern world.
DECLASSIFIED ACHIEVES
202-246 1142
Abstract
The Federal archival agency, the Russian Ministry of foreign affairs and the Russian Historical Society organized in 2018 a large-scale historical documentary project (an exhibition and online publication) on the background and consequences of the Munich Agreement (November 1937 – March 1938)11 This year marked by the 80th anniversary of the beginning of Second World War the project is to be continued in the form of an exhibition and an online publication of archival documents. We offer our readers some French documents. They are stored at the Russian State Military Archive in the fund «The Ministry of War of France. Military districts, fortified areas, army, corps, divisions, regiments, brigades, military educational institutions and other military organizations» (RGVA. F. 198k).) The fund contains materials on the activities of the French highest military bodies and their units, as well as documents on the headquarters and garrisons of the French military fortresses. These documents were moved from Germany to Moscow after the end of World War II and subsequently were incorporated into the foreign funds of RGVA. In 1993–1994 on the basis of bilateral intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the field of state archives, identification and return of archival documents and on the basis of the Federal Law of April 15, 1998 No. 64-ФЗ «On Cultural Values Moved to the USSR as a Result of the Second World War and Located on the territory of the Russian Federation» the documents of the 198k fund were transferred to France. The most valuable of the them were microfilmed; their copies are kept in the RGVA on the rights of originals. The two documents being published in this issue of MGIMO Review of International Relations are part of the 198k fund (second inventory), containing documents from French military attachés in European countries, which focus on their political and economic situation, armed forces, countries occupied by Germany, foreign and domestic USSR policy, the state of the Red Army, as well as intelligence reports of the 2nd bureau of the General Staff of the French army. Both documents: Note by the French military attaché in the USSR O.-A. Palace to the Minister of National Defense and the Minister of War of France E. Daladier about the strategic situation in Eastern Europe and its influence on the position of the USSR government on the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement on mutual assistance of July 13, 1939 (RGVA. F. 198. Op. 2. D. 466. L. 43–50) and the Report of the French Military Attaché in Poland F. Musse to the Minister of National Defense and the Minister of War of France E. Daladier on the influence of Poland on the course and results of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations of August 24, 1939 (RGVA. F. 198k. Op.2. D. 292. L. 148–166) are published in Russian translation for the first time.
BOOK REVIEWS
247-256 724
Abstract
Book review: Foreign Economic Policy of Russia amid the Contemporary Global Risks. Ed. A.A. Tkachenko. Moscow. Kurs. 2019. 320 p.
ISSN 2071-8160 (Print)
ISSN 2541-9099 (Online)
ISSN 2541-9099 (Online)