THE LEGACY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
The concept of uneven and combined development where the interconnectedness and interactions of different societies shape and combine with their internal structures to drive the evolution of comparative development and power is used to examine the drivers of successive phase of global development in the 100 years since 1917. This concept was coined by left-wing theorist and the Soviet Communist party leader Leo Trotsky with the aim of explaining peculiarities of imperialRussia’s development. Currently it is applied for different cases of political and economic development on the global level. The concept of uneven and combined development allows taking into account both intra-state and extra-state factors, including political regimes evolution, international trade dynamics.
Most attention is paid to the drivers of secular economic decline in the United States and the Western world, the way it was tempered by a wave of productive and financial globalization that itself permitted the rise of a number of emerging economies with the economic, political and cultural capacity to exploit latecomer advantage and the way the rise of new powers is leading in the direction of a polycentric multi-civilizational world and a possibly more inclusive model of development. To put it simply, the article addresses political economy of global power shifts and their prospects.
Using original documents from the Russian State Military Historical Archive, many of which are introduced for the first time, the author reveals details of creation and activities of the Serbian Volunteer Corps formed from captured soldiers and officers of the Austro-Hungarian army inOdessain the Summer 1916. The same autumn it received a baptism of fire in Dobruja fighting in the separate corps of the Russian army under the command of General Zayonchkovsky. The research interest in studying the activities of “national” and "international" military units within the Russian army is connected with the question of expediency and effectiveness of using such forces against those for whom they have not so long ago shed blood. The author, contrary to the popular opinion of Serbian historians, shows that the call to join the First Serbian division did not arouse mass enthusiasm among the prisoners of war both Serbs and representatives of other Yugoslav nations because of well-founded fears for their close relatives living in the Dual Monarchy and a fairly comfortable stay in the Russian captivity. At the same time, the author emphasizes that this military unit, commanded by officers of the Serbian regular army, was considered by the political leadership ofSerbiaas the basis of the future armed forces of the new state ofYugoslavia. The article shows that the events of the Russian Revolution of 1917 influenced the future fate of this military formation. Many of its soldiers later found themselves on different sides of the front in the Russian civil war. A special attention is payed to the interethnic conflict erupted in the corps between the Serbs on the one side and the Croats and Slovenes on the other. The author introduces a significant body of primary documents showing the nuances of relations in the corps between representatives of various Yugoslav nations. The article emphasizes that the relationship of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes within the corps became the prologue to the future tragic fate of the Yugoslav state and its army, which were doomed to eventually collapse.
In the year of 100th anniversary of the October Revolution, the author turns to the question of the Soviet heritage influence on nation- and state-building processes in three countries of the South Caucasus –Azerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgia. The article postulates clear differences between the study of postcolonialism and the post-Soviet space, and therefore the author presents his own operationalization of the "imperial heritage" study.
The countries of the South Caucasus are compared based on the following criteria: a number of ethnic Russians as the main constituent of the Soviet people living in the country; a status of the Russian language; national symbols (statutes, architecture, Soviet state symbols, the hierarchy of military ranks), and political practices (functioning of the party systems, type of sovereignty, degree of freedom of speech and political competition).
StudyingAzerbaijan,ArmeniaandGeorgiadifferently coming out of theUSSRand using the disintegration of theUSSRto construct their national narratives in accordance with their own ideas about the ways of development, the author finds a repetition of the Soviet system elements.
Each of the states demonstrates a unique combination of “post-Soviet Soviet” phenomena. The difference lies in the ratio between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet elements.
Azerbaijanseems to maintain a pro-Soviet narrative more than the others. It inherited the Soviet cult of personality and combined this practice with a completely non-Soviet (Eastern) tradition of political dynasties covered by the election system.
The Armenian political tradition includes reference to Soviet Armenia as theSecondRepublic, which distinguishes the country from the neighbors who consider themselves to be the successors of the democratic republics that emerged during the Civil War inRussia. Despite competitive elections and free media, the Armenian leadership seeks to establish a political system with a single dominant party and formally maintain electoral competition. This conjunction of Soviet symbols (Armeniadid not carry out systematic decommunization) and political practices is oddly mixed with the image of GareginNzhdeh as “the father of nation”, a person who was accused in theUSSRfor collaborating with the Third Reich.
Georgia tries to part with the Soviet Union to the maximum extent at a symbolic level, has made great progress in building formal democratic institutions, but in reality it is still managed through informal procedures, to which discursive and symbolic decommunization did not affect in principle. Discursive and symbolic decommunization had no impact on the way this country is ruled.
The study is based on the data from national censuses, sociological studies, texts of official documents and, especially, the invaluable experience of the included observation of symbolic politics in all three countries.
EUROPE AND THE WORLD
The article deals the phenomenon of trilateralism – the term used to describe relations between theUnited States of America,JapanandWestern Europe. The article presents an overview of factors that encourage closer ties between the regions as well as an analysis of trends that may potentially cause the collapse of the trilateral format.
The factors that have initially created trilateralism include common political approaches, a shared economic demand and a strong need for energy security. Though these components remain an important part of trilateral relations; the range of factors that affect trilateralism is much wider today than four decades ago.
Risks that may lead to the disruption of trilateralism are identified. Firstly, trilateral relations are strikingly asymmetrical: ties between theUS,JapanandWestern Europedevelopat different ratesand an evident disproportion exists in sharing responsibilities. Namely, bilateral relations between theUSandJapanand theUSand Western Europe are closer than the cooperation betweenJapanandWestern Europe.
Secondly, there is a divergence in foreign policy priorities of the countries. With European priorities lying within the European Union, further integration and relations with the neighbors andJapanactively monitoring the developments in the Asia-Pacific, theUShas yet to articulate its foreign policy.
Thirdly, economic issues that used to bethe core of relations between the three sides during the Cold Warare gradually disappearing from the trilateral agenda. An analysis oftask force reports to Trilateral Commission – an expert format that embodies trilateral relations – demonstrates the tendencies mentioned above.
The author comes to the conclusion that trilateralism is on the verge of change. Its future mainly depends on the choice of issues for further cooperation and on the effectiveness of the format in dealing with global problems as they arise.
The international actorness of the European Union is an object of prolonged scholarly and political debates. As an association of states with both complementary and competing interests it faces the problem of collective action. The EU elaborated several mechanisms to mitigate it effect, which, however, do not necessarily avail it to conduct a coherent policy towards other major powers. The current article demonstrates that when it comes to defending European interests in the world arena,Brusselsfaces a range of challenges even in the most developed spheres of the integration process, such as international economic cooperation. Due to the insufficiency of hegemony, common identity and institutional weakness, the member states of the European Union tend to pursue their own private interests, rather than speak for the common interest. This tendency is traced in the article using the record of relations between the EU andChina. Despite the fact that the EU is, in many ways, wealthier and technologically more developed thanChina, its dependence on huge financial resources flowing from the Asian ascending power has grown in 2010s. While the European Commission’s goal is to secure access to Chinese market for European companies, individual member states vie for Chinese investments. To illustrate this, the article highlights competitive strategies ofGermany,Great Britain,Franceand Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). It examines engagement of the CEECs in the Chinese initiative “16+1”. The authors conclude that competition between European states in financial sphere reduces their bargaining leverage not only in economic matters, but also on some political issues.
In the post-bipolar world nuclear power has become one of the areas of competition and rivalry betweenRussiaand the West. The comprehensive analysis of theoretical publications allows us to consider international competition as an abstract, depoliticized contest of states and other international actors (including companies) for some limited (mainly economic) benefits. International rivalry is more a political process, necessarily involving some rival pairs of states (or groups of states) that compete with each other not only to get some benefits, but to expand their territory or power.
The competition and rivalry betweenRussiaand the West in the sphere of nuclear power are especially apparent in the Eastern European region where the American, European and Japanese corporations, with the support of the Western foreign ministries and EU institutions, try to achieve two main goals. The first goal is to win the contracts to build new power units, especially in tenders where Rosatom participates. The second goal is to become suppliers of nuclear fuel for multiple Russian- or Soviet-made VVER-type reactors, which are functioning or will be run in a number of countries in the region (Slovakia,CzechRepublic,Hungary,Bulgaria, andUkraine). Such activities can involve high risks. The West’s efforts to curb the dominant position of "Rosatom" inEastern Europeare formally associated with the need to create a "competitive market" of nuclear services in the region and to ensure the European energy security. It is also noteworthy that the expansion of Rosatom (and its predecessors) to foreign markets, including Eastern Europe, is actively supported by the Russian state which in the second half of the 1990s – after a failed attempt of following in the footsteps of the West – joined in the rivalry, mostly imposed by the U.S. and their allies.
As shown by the analysis,Russiaand the West, primarily theUnited States, are involved in the nuclear power sector to advance their economic interests, expressed in the success of their national corporations. However, they are also political rivals that consider the nuclear power industry generating billions of dollars and supplying energy to many countries as one of important geopolitical resources.
The article deals with the policies of EU countries towards coal power plants as well as practical steps taken by their governments. Coal power plants are widely considered to be environmentally harmful which confronts with environmental policies of the EU suggesting Europe-wide cuts of greenhouse gas emissions. Based on that assumption a number of EU countries such asBelgium,Austria,Portugal,Dania,Finland,SwedenandUKare striving to phase out coal power plants and achieved significant progress on this path replacing coal with other generation sources. On the other hand, other EU members are lagging behind as coal phase-out is not an urgent item of their political agenda. This situation is typical forIreland,Netherlands,Italy,Croatia,SloveniaandSlovakia. Domestic coal extracting industry can pose a significant hindering factor for a coal power plants phase-out and can effectively block the process. This is the case inBulgaria,Romania,Hungary,CzechRepublic,GreeceandPoland. ButGermany, which also has a well-developed coal industry, transforms its energy sector towards a green one cutting the share of coal in the generation mix. If this effort of the German government proves successful it will deliver a positive transformation model for other EU countries with a large share of coal in generation-mix due to domestic coal extraction industry. The analysis of the political and economic (both macro and micro) processes leads to conclusion that there is no unity among EU member states in their approach towards coal fired power plants phase-out. This will allow for coal power plants to retain their market share in a short to medium term. But in the longer run one can expect a significant decrease of coal fired generation inEurope, even in the countries traditionally dependent on coal.
This article examines the tools that the EU in interactions with third countries in the field of STI uses. The EU is a pioneer in the use of science and technology in the international arena, the creation of strategic bilateral agreements on science and technology and the conduct of political dialogues at the highest political level (at the country and regional levels). The EU actively uses its foreign policy instruments of influence, including the provision of access to its framework programs to researchers from third countries, as well as scientific diplomacy. The success of these programs and scientific diplomacy shows the effectiveness of the EU as a global actor.
In its foreign policy global innovation strategy, the EU proceeds from the premise that no state in the world today can cope independently with modern global challenges such as climate change, migration, terrorism, etc. Therefore, the solution of these issues requires both an expert evaluation from an independent world scientific community, and the perseverance of diplomats and officials of branch ministries of national states capable of conveying the views of their government in international negotiations and defending national interests of the country to find a solution that suits everyone.
The EU has the resources to create a "cumulative effect" by developing and applying common norms on the territory of theUnion, analyzing the innovation policies of member states and the possibility of sharing best practices. At the same time, the EU shares its vision of problems, values and priorities with partners and uses the tools of "soft power" (including its smart and normative force) and scientific diplomacy in the field of STI.
The soft power of the EU in the field of STI lies in the attractiveness of the EU as a research area in which it is possible to conduct modern high-quality international research with the involvement of scientific teams from different countries in both physical and virtual spaces. The EU training programs and expertise contribute to the development of a flexible approach in international cooperation, supported by scientific facts. On this basis practical, scientific partnerships are formed and scientific exchanges are taking place.
The article is devoted to the issue of the Flemish separatism, including autonomism and independism (the latter aiming at the creation of own power center), and how it is reflected in the programs of the Flemish right-wing populist parties. The author presents a brief history of the phenomenon; Flemish separatism is seen in the context of the European integration and in comparison with other separatist movements. Having been articulated politically in 1990s, Flemish separatism is now an inherent part of the right-wing populist party programs: of the Flemish Bloc program (since 2004 it is Flemish Interest) as an independence appeal, and of the New Flemish Alliance program as a call for further state reforming, aiming at the creation of a confederative system. A number of Flanders independence plans have been elaborated, whose authors posit that it is not Flanders that should quit the federation, but Belgium should officially disintegrate into two parts (because only in this case the French-speaking part of the country will not become the sole heir of the federation). The separatists usually see the EU as an institutional barrier; however, its role is acknowledged in the strengthening of regions’ position in the entireEurope. The elements that should keep the Belgian federation intact are not de facto functioning properly; however, gaining full independence would only fix the de jure already existing administrative and political split, and would also create a number of administrative problems. That is why the percentage of the Flemish independence proponents has declined recently, and the Belgian federation is now in a certain “break-even point” that can be distorted by the right-wing populist parties.
MIDDLE EAST
The article deals with the problem of politicizing Islam. The author states that Salafits’s approach to political domain of social being is at odds with original Islam. The article uses historical analysis in order to demonstrate different stages of politicizing Islam. The author also uses constructivist approach to show how radical Islamic ideologies are constructed.
Until 19th century, Islam was a set of beliefs and social model but had no status of political system. However, due to externaland internal it gradually embarked on political path and started to acquire more active presence in various spheres of social life. Later new political culture was formed that constructed a new radical identity criticizing and even denying the existing norms of traditional Islam. Departing from many political, economic and cultural norms and referring to the holy Koran and Sunnah, radical Islamists aspire to establish an “ideal” or “pure” international society.
The author concludes that the Neo-Salafists have transformed the traditional idea of jihad into an idea of global jihad and have made it their security manifesto. This leads to the globalizing effect which implies that regional security problems in theMiddle Eastare becoming the area of international community’s concern.
The article identifies four main events driving the current changes in thePersian Gulfoil monarchies. Located in a troubled and unstable region of the Middle East with the oil prices declining after the events of the “Arab spring” and election of Donald Trump as president of theUnited States, Gulf oil monarchies are under pressure from inside and outside to undergo significant changes. As a consequence, validity of the theory of «monarchical exclusiveness» is called into question. The political elites in the monarchies recognize the need to depart from the status quo, although the phenomenon of the «king’s dilemma» is still present there. The author argues that the monarchy should undergo conservative liberalization. To avoid political destabilization they should apply a gradual, evolutionary approach to liberalization providing their societies with enough time to adapt to new developments. Along with the gradual liberalisation process there is also need in institutional development to make institutions stronger and more independent.
ECONOMIC THEORY
The prime focus in this article is on key findings concerning theoretical aspects of strategic behavior by incumbents to deter market entry of new firms. The author summarizes main lines of scientific research in the topic which give an insight into the patterns of the incumbent’s impact on the behavior of the entrants, the entry deterrence instruments and the consequences of these actions.
Today the free entry markets are considered to be a rare phenomenon. The market entry of new firms is associated with significant entry costs, which allow the incumbents to take advantage of their dominant position and derive positive economic profits. In case of entry threat by potential competitors the incumbents take strategic actions aimed at deterring entry and preserving their dominant position. Among the most efficient strategic actions one can emphasize the erection of additional barriers to entry for the newcomers through producing the limit output and price, investments in sunk assets, capacity expansion and product differentiation. Meanwhile by taking strategic actions the incumbents are not always trying to affect the entrant’s costs and profit directly, they often aim at changing the entrant’s expectations regarding future intentions of the incumbents to preserve dominant position.
BOOK REVIEWS
Book review: Chomsky N. A New Generation Draws the Line: Humanitarian Intervention and the “Responsibility to Protect” Today.Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012. 176 p. The book under review examines controversial norm of “humanitarian intervention”. It clearly demonstrates that the norm was used selectively and with different argumentations in various situations. Noam Chomsky has managed to present a fair and balanced account of positive and negative aspects of humanitarian interventions as well as provide thought-provoking policy recommendations for improving human rights protection.
Review of the book on Russian emigration toSofia. It traces the history and influence of Russian immigrants on the capital ofBulgaria. Mikhneva R., Grozev K., Rupcheva G. “Little Russia” on the yellow paving stones.Sofia: Kameia Grup EOOD, 2016. 246 p.
ISSN 2541-9099 (Online)