APPROACHES TO BUILDING OF GLOBAL STRATEGIC DETERRENCE SYSTEM PAST 2021

The article studies prospective for transformation of the current global deterrence system in 21^st century, paying special attention to the structures of treaties past 2021. After the mainstay arms control treaty (New START) expiration development of the new system of treaties and agreements seems inevitable, quite possibly, on multilateral basis. The hypothesis stressing possibility of multilateral deterrence system for global stability is quite popular nowadays. Studying the dynamics of nuclear arms cuts and monitoring progress on New START treaty, we can see numerous positive effects. However, the nuclear modernization programs currently in progress or planned for the near future should be taken into account for future agreements. This is when geospatialanalysis is important, demonstrating effectively which states are deterring each other and for which ones this is simply impossible because of the available weapons delivery range. This analysis is performed for three possible candidates for future multilateral treaties: USA, Russia and China, mentioning Great Britain and France as well. Going further into geospatial analysis, strategic ABM factor is accounted and the role of global ABM is estimated for future treaties. Numerical estimates of nuclear potentials of third countries - incomparable to the current numbers in possession of two main nuclear powers - performed specifically. Based on the analysis provided we can effectively deny the possibility of multilateral agreements for future deterrence scenarios. However, some steps for involving third countries into the global process of nuclear regulations can be outlined. This includes a number of bilateral agreements for arms control in certain regions, specifically developed to form a system of treaties aimed for global tensions reduction moving towards a safer world in the 21st century.

Nuclear weapons, strategic deterrence, international treaties, START, New START, foreign policy, multilateral agreements, multilateral treaties

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